

K.L.
from E.K.R.

THIRTY-THIRD

ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

DANTE SOCIETY

(CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

1914

ACCOMPANYING PAPERS

DANTE AND SERVIUS

By Edward Kennard Rand

THE GODDESS FORTUNA IN THE DIVINE COMEDY

By Howard Rollin Patch

BOSTON

GINN AND COMPANY

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STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS

(From May 20, 1913, to May 19, 1914)

Balance in the hands of the Treasurer, May 20, 1913	\$948.79	
Members' fees till May 19, 1914	355.00	
Copyrights and sales	56.63	
Interest	<u>18.16</u>	
		\$1378.58
Paid Ginn and Company	\$133.74	
Paid the Treasurer of Harvard College (for the Library)	150.00	
Paid the Treasurer of Harvard College (for the Dante prize).	100.00	
Refunded from sales of the Fay Concordance . .	36.00	
Printing, postage, etc.	12.80	
Balance in the hands of the Treasurer, May 19, 1914	<u>946.04</u>	
		\$1378.58

BY-LAWS

1. This Society shall be called the DANTE SOCIETY. Its object shall be the encouragement of the study of the Life and Works of Dante.

2. Any person desirous to become a member of this Society may do so by signifying his or her wish in writing to the Secretary, and by the payment of an annual fee of five dollars.

3. An Annual Meeting for the election of officers shall be held at Cambridge on the third Tuesday of May, of which due notice shall be given to the members by the Secretary.

4. Special meetings may be held at any time appointed by vote of the members at the Annual Meeting, or by call from the President and Secretary.

5. The officers shall be a President, a Vice President, a Secretary and Treasurer, and a Librarian, who, together with three members thereto chosen, shall form the Council of the Society. All these officers shall be chosen at the Annual Meeting, and their term of service shall be for one year, or until their successors are elected. Vacancies in the Council shall be filled for the remainder of the year by the Council.

6. The President, or, in his absence, the Vice President, or, in the absence of both, any member of the Council, shall preside at all meetings of the Society and of the Council.

7. The Secretary and Treasurer shall keep a record of the meetings of the Society and of the Council, shall collect and receive all dues, and keep accounts of the income and expenditure of the Society, shall give notice of meetings, and shall perform all other duties appropriate to his office.

8. The Council shall hold meetings at such times as it may appoint, shall determine on the use to be made of the income of the Society, shall endeavor to promote the special objects of the Society in such ways as may seem most appropriate, and shall make an annual report of their

proceedings, including a full statement of accounts, at each Annual Meeting. This report shall be made in print for distribution to the members.

9. No officer of the Society shall be competent to contract debts in the name of the Society, and no expenditure shall be made without a vote of the Council.

10. A majority of the Council shall form a quorum for the transaction of business.

11. Any person distinguished for his interest in the purposes of the Society, or who has rendered it valuable service, may be chosen an Honorary Member at any regular meeting of the Society, and shall be entitled to all its privileges without annual assessment.

12. The preceding rules may be changed at any time by unanimous vote of the Council.

THE DANTE PRIZE

The Society offers an annual prize of one hundred dollars for the best essay by a student in any department of Harvard University, or by a graduate of not more than three years' standing, on a subject drawn from the life or works of Dante. The competition is open to students and graduates of similar standing of any college or university in the United States.

For the year 1914-1915 the following subjects were proposed:

1. *A study of the vocabulary of Dante's Lyrics.*
2. *The classification of Dante's Miscellaneous Lyrics.*
3. *The influence of Boethius on the Vita Nuova and the Convito.*
4. *A discussion of the authorship of Il Fiore.*
5. *A study of Dante's influence upon English literature (or upon any single author or period).*
6. *The relation of Dante's theological doctrines to the present teachings of the Church of Rome.*
7. *The relation of modern scientific discovery to Dante's conception of the divine order of the universe.*
8. *The main reasons for the increase of interest in the Divina Commedia during the past fifty years.*
9. *Dante and Cecco d'Ascoli.*
10. *A study of the decline of Dante's influence in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.*
11. *Modern traits in Dante.*
12. *Dante in the anecdotic literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.*
13. *The influence of Guido Cavalcanti on Dante.*
14. *A criticism of Torraca's edition of the Divina Commedia.*

Essays must be deposited with the Dean of Harvard College Cambridge, Mass., on or before the *first day of May*.

Essayists are at liberty to write on any one of the subjects which have been proposed in the years during which the Dante Prize has been offered, or to propose new subjects for the approval of the Council of the Society.

On the title-page must be written an assumed name and a statement of the writer's standing, i.e. whether he is a graduate or an undergraduate (and of what college or university); if he is an undergraduate, to what class he belongs, and to what department of the college or university. Under cover with the essay must be sent a sealed letter containing the true name and address of the writer, and superscribed with his assumed name.

The essays must be written upon letter paper, of good quality, of the quarto size, with a margin of not less than one inch at the top, at the bottom, and on each side, so that they may be bound up without injury to the writing. The sheets on which the essay is written must be securely stitched together.

The judges of the essays are a committee of the Dante Society.

In case the judges decide that no essay submitted to them deserves the full prize, they are at liberty to award one or two prizes of fifty dollars, or to award no prize.

The Dante Society has the privilege of retaining and depositing in the Dante Collection of the Harvard College Library any or all essays offered in competition for the Dante Prize, whether successful or not.

Since its establishment the Dante Prize (in full or in part) has been awarded to the following persons:

HEINRICH CONRAD BIERWIRTH 1887

For an essay entitled *Dante's Obligations to the Schoolmen, especially to Thomas Aquinas*.

GEORGE RICE CARPENTER 1888

For an essay entitled *The Interpretation and Reconciliation of the Different Accounts of his Experiences after the Death of Beatrice, given by Dante in the Vita Nuova and the Convito*.

CHARLES STERRETT LATHAM 1890

For an essay entitled *A Translation into English of Dante's Letters, with Explanatory and Historical Comments*.

KENNETH MCKENZIE 1894

For an essay entitled *The Rise of the Dolce Stil Nuovo*.

JEREMIAH DENIS MATTHIAS FORD 1895

For an essay entitled *Dante's Influence upon Spanish Literature during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*.

ANNETTE FISKE 1897

For an essay entitled *Dante's Obligations to Old French and Provençal Lyric Poetry*.

ARTHUR NEWTON PEASLEE 1900

For an essay entitled *A Metrical Rhyming Translation of the Three Canzoni of the Convito*.

HENRY LATIMER SEAVER 1901

For an essay entitled *A Translation of the Canzoni in the Convito*.

ALAIN CAMPBELL WHITE 1902

The Latham Prize for an essay entitled *A Translation of the Quaestio de Aqua et Terra, and a Discussion of its Authenticity*.

ALPHONSO DE SALVIO 1902

For an essay entitled *The Verse Endings in the Divina Commedia in which Dante has made "li vocaboli dire nelle sue rime altro che quello ch' erano appo gli altri dicitore usati di sprimere."*

FRITZ HAGENS 1903

For an essay entitled *A Critical Comment of the De Vulgari Eloquentia*.

CHANDLER RATHFON POST 1906

For an essay entitled *The Beginnings of the Influence of Dante in Castilian and Catalan Literature*.

ALEXANDER GUY HOLBORN SPIERS 1907

For an essay entitled *Characteristics of the Vita Nuova*.

RALPH HAYWARD KENISTON 1909

For an essay entitled *The Dante Tradition in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*.

ROGER THEODORE LAFFERTY 1912

For an essay entitled *The Philosophy of Dante*.

GEORGE HUSSEY GIFFORD 1913

For an essay entitled *Expressions of Gratitude in Dante*.

RICHARD AGER NEWHALL 1914

For an essay entitled *Italian Ghibellinism as reflected in Dante*.

ANNUAL REPORT

The thirty-third annual meeting of the Dante Society was held on May 19, 1914, at the house of the President, 11 Francis Avenue, Cambridge. The reports of the Secretary and Treasurer were read and accepted, and the officers of the previous year were reëlected. Mr. William Roscoe Thayer, Mr. Jeremiah Denis Matthias Ford, and Miss Katharine Vaughan Spencer were chosen members of the Council. The Secretary reported that three essays had been submitted for the Dante prize, and that a half-prize had been awarded to Richard Ager Newhall, of the senior class in Harvard College, for a study of "Italian Ghibellinism as reflected in Dante."

After the regular business was transacted Professor Grandgent spoke briefly concerning current literature relating to Dante. The Secretary gave an account of a letter and an essay by a deceased member of the Society, Mr. Louis Dyer, on Dante's conception of Fortuna. The letter has since been published with the thirty-second Annual Report.

Another study of Fortuna, by Dr. Howard Rollin Patch, is submitted to the members of the Society with the present report. Mr. Patch's paper does not continue the particular inquiry suggested by Mr. Dyer, but is based upon an extensive investigation of the whole history

of the conception of Fortuna in mediæval literature. The author's conclusions with respect to Dante are of such interest as to make desirable their publication in this separate essay, and it is to be hoped that his complete monograph, with its fuller statement and confirmation of his opinions, may soon be printed.

The paper on "Dante and Servius," which is also published herewith, was read by Professor Rand at the annual meeting in 1915, and the Council are glad to be able to make it accessible now to all members of the Society.

FRED NORRIS ROBINSON

Secretary

CAMBRIDGE, April 11, 1916

DANTE AND SERVIUS

BY EDWARD KENNARD RAND

How did Dante study his *buon maestro* Virgil? Directly, of course, and with a penetrating vision denied to many a humanist of the Renaissance and many a philologist of our own day. But Dante doubtless did not despise the assistance offered by commentators of the ancient poet. The commentator was a distinctly exalted person in the Middle Ages. The Latin authors entered the Carolingian period accompanied by their faithful interpreters—Horace with Porphyrius, Statius with "Lactantius Placidus," Virgil with Servius; if an author had no ancient commentary, as was true of Ovid and at first of Terence, some gallant scholar, not infrequently an Irishman, came to the rescue, and equipped his work with glosses. A writer without this retinue of respectful comment was somehow lacking in dignity. Hence, perhaps, arose in the early Middle Ages the practice of an author's commenting on his own work in case nobody appeared to perform the task for him. Hence, also, a fresh impulse was given to allegory; for if a work was to receive the honor of a commentary, it should contain matter that needed explanation. The tradition thus started prevailed through the mediæval period, and is illustrated by Dante himself in his observations on his own poems in the *Vita Nuova* and the *Convivio*. In another way he may have paid tribute to the literary customs of his age. His elaborate system of allegory, described in the *Convivio*¹ and the letter to Can Grande della Scala,² may have been inspired not only by the current theory on the matter, as expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas,³ but by a special study of some allegorical exposition of Virgil's *Æneid*. Dante very probably knew Fulgentius, or possibly some mediæval affair of like temper, such as the commentary written on Virgil by Bernard Silvester of Tours.⁴ Thus infused with esoteric meanings, the *Æneid* became a human

¹ *Conviv.* II, 1.

² *Epist.* X, 7.

³ *Summa Theol.*, Pars I, Quaest. I, Art. ix-x.

⁴ Only excerpts have been published. See Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* 1836, pp. 639 ff.

document of somewhat alarming proportions; one could say of it most emphatically, as of Dante's poem, "*subiectum est homo.*" This *Æneis moralizata*, no less than the true *Æneid* that Dante well understood, may have served as a pattern for the *Commedia*.

The present paper is concerned not with the abstruse divinations of the allegorists, but with the humbler interpretation of Servius. It is almost a foregone conclusion that Dante should have at least consulted Servius occasionally, and students of Dante to-day have found helpful clues to the poet's meaning in the ancient commentator's remarks. Having chanced on several such passages which, so far as I know, have not been adequately noticed, I have set them forth in the hope that some more competent hand may carry the investigation further.

I

The casual reader of Virgil's epic may not observe that the revelation made to Æneas in the world below is, like that in Dante's vision, divided between two mediators. Virgil at least adumbrates the idea, so plainly set forth in the *Commedia*, of a preliminary and partial revelation succeeded by fuller and loftier truth. Æneas and the Sibyl cross the Styx, pass through the Limbo and the Mournful Fields, which are reserved for those whose lives on earth were for various reasons incomplete, stop by the walls of Tartarus, where the Sibyl describes the punishments of the mighty sinners confined within, and then make their way to Anchises in the Elysian Fields. Thus far the Sibyl has given all the explanations. From that moment on she has nothing to say, but remains by the hero's side, a *πρόσωπον κωφόν*, while Anchises expounds the mystic philosophy which the poet, for dramatic as well as temperamental reasons, chooses as a setting for his panorama of Roman history and his exalted panegyric of the Roman state. Perhaps Dante caught from Virgil's text alone a suggestion for the twofold revelation of the *Commedia*. Perhaps he devised his scheme on the promptings of his own imagination. But also, perhaps, his imagination may have been spurred by the following note in Servius on the Sibyl's words to the bard Musæus, who meets her and the hero at the entrance to Elysium:

Tuque optime vates (*Æn.* VI, 669): quia (i.e. Musæus) theologus fuit. Et sciendum hoc loco Sibyllam iam a numine derelictam; unde et interrogat, quod alias non faceret.

In matters of theology, the Sibyl has to ask questions; before long she will be dumb in the presence of a greater prophet who, like Beatrice in the *Commedia*, has power to explain the innermost mysteries of creation and human history.

II

Why is Dante's *Inferno* partitioned into nine circles? Perhaps to make a pendant to a Paradise of nine circles, which owes its design to the ancient astronomy handed down to the Middle Ages first and foremost, it would appear, in Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* and Macrobius's commentary thereon. Dante loved the number nine, and starting with a ninefold Paradise might well without prompting have contrived an *Inferno* to match. Certainly Virgil's text gives no hint of such a picture. There is a *facilis descensus* from earth to Hades, but no succession of descents when Hades is once reached. There are undulating valleys in Elysium, and Tartarus, like a huge well, has its own depths; but Virgil's Hell is constructed, vaguely and mysteriously, on a generally uniform level. One searches in vain for anything like nine descending circles. The Styx, to be sure, winds nine times about the dolorous country; that is to imprison its inmates the more securely:

fas obstat, tristisque palus inamabilis undae
alligat et novies Styx interfusa coerces (vv. 438 f.).

But Servius cannot let the definite numeral *novies* go by without elucidation. According to him, the poet declares "*novem esse circulos Stygis quae inferos cingit*," and in his note on another passage, the commentator describes them.

In limine primo (v. 427): novem circulis inferi cincti esse dicuntur, quos nunc exsequitur. Nam primum dicit animas infantum tenere, secundum eorum qui sibi per simplicitatem adesse nequiverunt, tertium eorum qui evitantes aerumnas se necarunt, quartum eorum qui amarunt, quintum virorum fortium dicit, sextum nocentes tenent qui puniuntur a iudicibus, in septimo animae purgantur, in octavo sunt animae ita purgatae ut redeunt in corpora, in nono ut iam non redeant, scilicet campus Elysium.

Now of course such a topography, which incidentally reveals in Servius an abysmal ignorance of Virgil's meaning, has no relation to the divisions of the *Inferno*, with a Limbo and subsequent circles of Lust,

Gluttony, Avarice and Prodigality, Anger, Heresy, Violence, Fraud and Deceit, and Treachery; Servius's plan has to include not only Hell, but Purgatory and Paradise. But the idea of nine separate compartments or circles was accessible to Dante in Servius. Servius has other passages, which I cannot discuss here, on the divisions of Hades. He makes the curious attempt (on vv. 127 and 439) to impress Ptolemaic astronomy into the service of Epicurean theology, which has dispensed with the *Tartareae sedes* altogether and located Hell on this earth; but as this idea is assigned to the subtler philosophers (*qui altius de mundi ratione quæsierunt*), Servius perhaps thought his simpler explanation truer to the poet's intention.

One question remains: Are the circles, as in Dante, arranged on a downward grade? We should imagine that even Servius would not put Elysium at the bottom of the well; he doubtless did not intend to do so. There is reason to believe, however, that at least part of Virgil's underworld was thought by Servius to have a downward incline, as appears in his comments on the rivers of Hell.

III

The Virgilian Hades is nine times belted by the river Styx (v. 439). But this bounding stream seems also to be called Acheron,¹ or Cocytus.² The situation is more distinct, though not much more, when Æneas and the Sibyl come through the portal of Orcus to the bank of the river (vv. 295 ff.):

Hinc via Tartarei quæ fert Acherontis ad undas.
Turbidus hic caeno vastaquæ voragine gurgēs
aestuat atque omnem Cocyto eructat harenam.

The bounding river here, then, is Acheron, a dirty brawling stream, which belches all its sand into the Cocytus. As they stand on the banks, the Sibyl informs Æneas that he beholds the pools of Cocytus and the Stygian marsh—

Cocyti stagna alta vides Stygiamque paludem (v. 323).

¹ V. 106 f.: quando hic inferni ianua regis | dicitur et tenebrosa palus Acheronte refuso, etc.

² Vv. 131 f.: tenent media omnia silvæ, | Cocytusque sinu labens circumvenit atro.

Then Charon appears and ferries them over — it were rash to say what river. Virgil leaves the picture in the blur of impressionism of which he is fond. The *nützliche Wandkarte* of the lower regions prepared for the schoolroom by a German savant gives us no help here. Virgil has a penchant for coloring rather than topography. He locates Phlegethon, however, more definitely; it is a river of fire surrounding the walls of Tartarus.

Servius, as ever, constructs a formal scheme for the rivers, finding one clue in the etymology, or his etymology, of their names. Acheron (v. 107), coming from ἄνευ χαρᾶς, means *sine gaudio*; Styx (v. 134), ἀπὸ τοῦ στυγεροῦ, is *maerior* or *tristitia*; Cocytus (v. 132), ἀπὸ τοῦ κωκύειν, is *luctus*; and Phlegethon (v. 265), from φλόξ, is *ignis* — the last two explanations fairly hit the mark. On v. 295 (*Hinc via Tartarei*, etc.) Servius remarks that Æneas and his guide come "*post errorem silvarum*" (Dante's *selva oscura*), to the streams of Hades. Taking *Tartarei* as an exact topographical term, the commentator infers that Acheron rises in the depths of Hell, flows upwards, and eventually belches its sand into the Cocytus; the Styx, for no very good reason that we can see, serves as a connecting link between the two.

Acheronta vult quasi de imo nasci Tartaro, huius aestuaria Stygem creare, de Styge autem nasci Cocytum.

This order of the streams, however, Acheron, Styx, Cocytus, is due merely to the poet's fancy. Calling etymology into play, Servius finds that the real or "physiological" order — psychological we should say — is different:

Et haec est mythologia: nam physiologia hoc habet, quia qui caret gaudio sine dubio tristis est. Tristitia autem vicina luctui est, qui procreatur ex morte: unde haec esse apud inferos dicit.

The ultimate begetter at the bottom of the pit is thus Mors, whence spring in succession, Cocytus, Styx, and Acheron. This order is repeated in the note on v. 385, where Servius adds that there are various tributaries:

De his autem nascuntur alia unde est (v. 439) *et novies Styx interfusa coarctet*.

Dante may well have read Servius's account of the Infernal rivers, and preferred, for matters of fact, the testimony of the commentator to that

of the poet. Mythology was not Dante's concern; his order is the real and "physiological." Acheron is his outermost and uppermost stream. Styx is reached at the fifth circle, that of the Wrathful and Sullen. With the sixth circle, we come to the City of Dis, about which we might expect Phlegethon to flow, as in Virgil; it appears instead after the sudden drop to the seventh circle. Cocytus is at the bottom of the lowest and coldest circle of all. May we venture a further step and suppose that Dante saw in Servius's phrase *luctui . . . qui procreatur ex morte* a hint of the personified Mors who accompanies Satan in the mediæval mysteries on the Harrowing of Hell? Dante's grim imagination and his sense of climax are cause enough for his setting Satan at the bottom of Hell; but as the Devil stands in the midst of the frozen pools of Cocytus, we may suspect some connection between Dante's picture and the remark of Servius that the Cocytus is derived from Mors. We must admit, of course, that though Dante started with Servius, as I think reasonable to assume, he readapted his material in the twenty-fourth Canto of the *Inferno*. Here the rivers do not spring from the depths of Hell; they accumulate from the tears of sin and suffering shed by the huge statue that symbolizes mankind. Dante has moulded bits from Servius and Nebuchadnezzar's dream in Daniel (ii, 31-33) into splendid imagery of his own.¹

IV

We turn from topographical to ethical considerations. The sin of sloth (*accidia*) seems a characteristically mediæval, or at least Christian, affair — not the state of mind, which has probably existed from the beginning of the world, but the exaltation of the vice into one of the principal categories. Aristotle's discussion of *πρότης* broaches the matter,² but Cassian seems to have been the first to draw up a formal list of the sins, among which the sin of sloth is numbered; his book *De Institutione Coenobiorum et de Octo Principalium Vitiorum Remediis* was written down to 426 A.D., and describes monastic theory and practice as Cassian had learned them in the East. His scheme of the vices does not differ

¹ Possibly some form of Plato's account of Tartarus and its rivers had also reached Dante. See *Phædo*, 112 A: ὁ καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσι τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν.

² *Eth. Nic.* IV, 11. See on the whole subject Dr. Moore's admirable essay in his *Studies in Dante*, Second Series, pp. 175 ff.

essentially from that of Dante in the *Purgatorio*; both have a place for *accidia* (ἀκηδία). Perhaps Servius can point us to another origin for the Christian classification which, however novel in its outcome, may have been based on older conceptions than those of monasticism. In his note on Lethe (v. 714), Servius has the following:

Docent autem philosophi, anima descendens quid per singulos circulos perdat: unde etiam mathematici fingunt, quod singulorum numinum potestatibus corpus et anima nostra conexas sunt ea ratione, quia cum descendunt animae trahunt secum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, libidinem Veneris, Mercurii lucri cupiditatem, Iovis regni desiderium: quae res faciunt perturbationem animabus, ne possint uti vigore suo et viribus propriis.

According, then, to the philosophers, who here seem like Neoplatonists, the soul, after leaving the ideal world, descends through the different spheres, losing some virtues in every circle; incidentally it would interest us to know what these virtues are. Similarly, the astrologers have a fable (*fingunt* is not a complimentary word) that the soul acquires a vice from every planet; thus the poor soul, dropping a virtue and picking up a vice at every station, is adequately attuned to human conditions by the time it reaches the earth. Now among the five examples given by Servius, not only is *accidia* represented (*torpor*), but *ira*, *libido*, and *lucri cupiditas* have their equivalents in the lists of Cassian and Dante. Does not the formal classification of the sins derive in part, at least, from astronomical fancies? The bit of Neoplatonic speculation in Servius's note is also tantalizing. Eduard Norden, in his magnificent edition of the *Sixth Aeneid*,¹ suggests that certain of the philosophical remarks in Servius, Macrobius, and St. Augustine are taken from a set of Neoplatonic *quaestiones* on the sixth *Aeneid*; the author, Norden thinks, may have been Marius Victorinus, the eminent Neoplatonic philosopher who became a Christian and who both before and after his conversion enjoyed the friendship of St. Augustine and St. Jerome. A pupil of Norden's, F. Bitzch, has written a dissertation on the subject,² and it is ripe for still further investigation. As a preliminary. I would here express the belief, which will be more fully set forth elsewhere,³ that the

¹ Leipzig, 1903, p. 29.

² *De Platoniorum quaestionibus quibusdam Vergilianis*. Berlin, 1911.

³ The subject will also be treated in a dissertation by Mr. H. T. Smith, candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Harvard University.

genuine commentary of Servius is hardly more than an extract from the longer version first published by Pierre Daniel in 1600, and that this longer version is substantially the supposedly lost commentary of Donatus. If this theory is correct, the Neoplatonistic and astronomical matter in the Servian commentary is pushed back in date, with the commentary as a whole, about half a century before the time of Servius. In this case it seems a little doubtful if Marius Victorinus, who was certainly not active as a teacher before Donatus, would have supplied the latter with material for his commentary; it is possible, of course, but Donatus's purpose, expounded in the introductory letter that accompanies his work, is to gather the opinions of the ancients. The bearing of all this on Dante is not immediate, except as it shows the pagan coloring of some of the traditional philosophy, and suggests a further examination of Dante's astronomy in the light of Servius.

V

My last example is a vexed point in literary history. In the twentieth Canto of the *Inferno*, Virgil is made to discourse on the founding of his native Mantua. The town, he declares, commemorates Manto, daughter of the seer Tiresias, who, leaving her Theban home for Italy, came down Lake Benaco and the river Mincio to a flat plain, marshy and pestilential. In this abandoned spot,

per fuggire ogni consorzio umano (v. 85),

she settled. On her death men built the city over her dead bones. This, Virgil protests, is the true story of the founding of Mantua (vv. 97 ff.):

"Però t'assenno, che se tu mai odi
 Orignar la mia terra altrimenti,
 La verità nulla menzogna frodi."

Curiously, the version which by implication Dante's Virgil denies, is that of the real Virgil, who names the founder as Ocnus (*Æn.* X, 198 ff.):

Ille etiam patriis agmen ciet Ocnus ab oris,
 fatidicae Mantus et Tusci filius amnis,
 qui muros matrisque dedit tibi, Mantua, nomen.

The Manto here mentioned is generally assumed to be an entirely different person from the Theban prophetess; she is called a river-nymph,

and thought to figure in some native Italian tradition that Virgil knew.¹ It is also suggested that Dante knew of the Greek Manto from Statius or from the brief statement in St. Isidore (*Origines*, XV, i, 59):

Manto Tiresiae filia post interitum Thebanorum dicitur delata in Italiam Mantuam condidisse: est autem in Venetia, quae Gallia Cisalpina dicitur: et dicta Mantua, quod manes tuetur.

But, why, the reader wonders, should Dante be so concerned with refuting his revered Virgil? Did he consider Statius or St. Isidore better authorities? It is Servius again, I believe, who helps us solve the question. On *Æn.* X, 198, he remarks:

Ocnus. Iste est Ocnus, quem in *Bucolicis* Bianorem dicit (*Ecl.* IX, 60). Hic Mantuam dicitur condidisse, quam a matris nomine appellavit: nam fuit filius Tiberis et Mantus, Tiresiae Thebani vatis, quae post patris interitum ad Italiam venit.

St. Isidore was not the first, then, to identify Virgil's Manto with the Theban. Virgil's commentator Servius has this tradition too. Servius, if I am right, is really Donatus; both Donatus and Isidore drew copiously from Suetonius. There is no evidence for tracking the present comment back to Suetonius, but whether he had it or not, it may well interpret Virgil's meaning correctly. What proof is there that his Manto was a river-nymph? The daughter of Tiresias might have become the mother of Ocnus by Father Tiber; river-gods, as the stories of Rea Silvia and Anna Perenna show, did not confine their attentions to nymphs. It is this part of the legend in which Dante does contradict his master. He may have felt so authorized on observing the uncertainty of Virgil himself; for in the ninth *Elogue* the founder of Mantua is called Bianor. We may now add the rest of the note in Servius.

Alii Manto filiam Herculis vatem fuisse dicunt. Hunc Ocnus alii Aulestis filium, alii fratrem, qui Perusiam condidit, referunt: et, ne cum fratre contenderet, in agro Gallico Felsinam, quae nunc Bononia dicitur, condidisse: permisisse etiam exercitui suo, ut castella muniret, in quorum numero Mantua fuit. Alii a Tarchone Tyrrheni fratre conditam dicunt: Mantuam autem ideo nominatam, quod Etrusca lingua Mantum, Ditem patrem appellant, cui etiam cum ceteris urbibus et hanc consecravit.

¹ See, for example, Conington on *Æn.* X, 198, and Grandgent, *Inferno* (ed. 1909), p. 161.

Here are contrarieties enough to puzzle any reader and to justify him in making his own selection. Servius, as he tells us several times,¹ relates the *historia* at which Virgil often glances, but which, according to the law of poetry, he need not report exactly. Dante, with the help of Servius, can go back to *historia* and, finding it a tangle, draw his own inferences and even instruct his master. His main prompting to do so is doubtless artistic; he would adjust the old material to the needs of his own creation. Manto is the chief figure in the fourth part of the eighth circle, where the soothsayers are confined. Amphiaraus, Tiresias, Aruns, Manto, and Eurypylus are taken from the ancient authors, Michael Scott and Asdente are modern. Dante chose to develop Manto, out of regard for Virgil's Mantua, and fashion for her an impressively repulsive character. For this, Statius gave a model in his account² of the gloomy rites in honor of the Powers of Darkness performed in a dismal wood by Tiresias with the assistance of Manto, who sips a libation from a bowl of blood. It has been remarked³ that the present Canto was written after *Purgatorio* XXII, since the poet there implies (v. 113) that Manto was in the Limbo, not in one of the lower circles of Hell. Manto has had a development in the poet's imagination. His chief purpose was not to contradict Virgil in the light of later authorities; he would doubtless infer from Servius that Virgil's Manto was Tiresias's daughter. But not to clutter his picture with irrelevant details, he omitted the uncertain story of Ocnus, and in a few lines, with the help of Statius, gave to the *verGINE cruda* a distinct and most unpleasant personality, appropriate for a sinner confined in the lower Hell. He then makes Virgil swear that this is the truth and the only truth.⁴

In these various instances, I believe, it is Servius that gives a not unimportant clue to the workings of Dante's imagination. Servius himself is in many ways a plodder and a bungler, but he has preserved after all

¹ For example, on *Æn.* I, 382: hoc loco per transitum tangit historiam, quam per legem artis poeticae aperte non potest ponere. There follows a quotation from Varro to show what the facts are.

² *Thebaid*, IV, 406 ff., esp. 463 ff. Another passage descriptive of Manto is X, 678 ff.

³ See Grandgent, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Dr. Edward Moore, *Studies in Dante*, I, 173, refers to Servius's account of Manto, without drawing the conclusions that I have presented here. His special section on Servius contains several matters that I have not discussed.

an intensely valuable assortment of information and misinformation. He offers a good point of departure for the imaginative. If it be conceded that Dante read him and to some extent borrowed from him in the passages discussed, a more systematic search in the old commentator might further serve to illuminate, in a humble way, the art of the *Divine Comedy*.

THE GODDESS FORTUNA IN THE *DIVINE COMEDY*

BY HOWARD ROLLIN PATCH

The famous portrait of the Goddess Fortuna which the Inferno¹ presents in the *Divine Comedy*, has already received considerable attention from scholars and critics. It is one of the many brief and eternally adequate pictures in the great allegory. As a solution of the problem of chance, its power and originality have been sufficiently noticed. Its relation to previous discussions of the goddess, the indebtedness of Dante to his predecessors in this particular account, has been carefully and sympathetically investigated.² And yet, curiously enough, not one of the studies of this remarkable figure has attempted to consider the relation of the conception to Dante himself, to Dante not as an artist but as a genius, not as a poet but as a human being. From all that has been said before, we might come away only admiring again the great cleverness of the author in dealing so satisfactorily with a ticklish philosophic problem and in settling at the same time a matter of allegorical technique.

The object of the present paper is not to invite further interest in the poet's skill, but to relate the figure as we find it to Dante's own point of view. That the goddess as she appears in this passage is unique, has already been suggested. That here we consequently have evidence of a particular and significant idea in Dante's religious beliefs, has not received full appreciation. First, I shall review the points in which this conception seems to be peculiar and to do this I shall have to examine the idea historically. In the second place, I shall study Dante's motives for introducing his special variations, and attempt to explain them psychologically.

¹ VII, ll. 67 ff.

² See for references one of the latest investigations: "Origine e Natura della 'Fortuna' Dantesca," Busetto, *Giorn. Dant.* XII (1904), pp. 129 ff.; and also Mr. Dyer's letter, published in the last report of this society (1915).

In short, by discovering what he does with a theme in its essentials not very new, I shall try to throw some light on the poet's religious convictions.

The goddess Fortuna, as she appears in varying guise in literature, obviously gives the clue to an author's faith. Whether we find her to be the goddess of chance as in Euripides, or a hidden force as in Joseph Conrad, or whether we find a sister goddess of hers, a sort of "Winged Destiny," as in Sophocles, clearly depends on the author's conception of the universe as ruled by a capricious or by a rational deity. Fortuna has been the central figure in the work of philosophers, dramatists, and poets, whose views concerning her methods and habits have formed a splendid tradition of legend, folklore, and art. But in surveying this mass of material, the artistic garb which the goddess has collected from all the ages, it is commonly forgotten that the matter has less to do with literature and art than with religion. Fortuna represents one idea of the great power that rolls through all things, or at least that rolls all things.

As the figure revealing an author's beliefs in religious matters, her record has been studied thoroughly enough so far as pagan times are concerned. But it is obvious that this goddess of chance may flourish in a Christian age as well. And never, I think, has her career received an investigation which included the period after the decline of Roman religion.¹ By going over the important points in this later, mediæval development of Fortuna, we may examine more fairly the treatment as we find it in Dante and so compare the poet's attitude with the customary method of regarding the goddess in his day.

By so doing, it is now clear, I hope, that we shall not merely reveal Dante's literary method, but we shall also better understand his views of life in general and of the world at large. It is a common dictum in criticism that Dante is the narrow, though far-seeing, genius of the Middle Ages; that he is deep, not broad; that being orthodox, he is out of touch with human life. With the material which this paper will offer, we ought to be able to examine Dante's method in dealing with what are some of the most perplexing problems of human life, in comparison with the methods of other men who faced the same or equivalent problems.

¹ Arturo Graf gives valuable hints for such a study in his *Miti, Leggende, e Superstizioni*, 1892, I, p. 273. I am much indebted to this article in my classifications.

I

The arbitrary goddess of destiny, so far as the ordinary figure with the title "Fortuna" is concerned, had her beginnings in ancient Rome. And by the time of the Empire, Fortuna was popularly accepted as the ruling goddess of human life, who acknowledged no settled order in her business — of whom it was legitimate to say :

Passibus ambiguis Fortuna volubilis errat

Et manet in nullo certa tenaxque loco :

Sed modo laeta manet ; vultus modo sumit acerbos ;

Et tantum constans in levitate sua est.¹

In general, she was vividly conceived and firmly believed in, whatever were the slight modifications of the belief in the case of her varied followers. We need not here point out particular devotees or analyze the ideas of any of the great Latin writers. We should be entering into a precarious game, in which guesswork must play a part, for a man's faith as he describes it and his real, working beliefs are not always similar. It is enough for us to observe that Fortuna had gathered together a great band of loyal worshippers, who built eighteen or more temples and shrines in her honor, and that she gradually absorbed the functions and duties of many other gods in her strange, vegetable-like cult of Fortuna-Panthea.

The important question for us to consider is what the conditions were which favored her development at this particular time. The Empire was a period of great skepticism and uncertainty. Most of the old gods had faded before the beautiful white light of the intellectual and materialistic rebirth. Greek deities were introduced into Rome with little success, or at least with little genuine effect on the popular conviction. Augustus attempted a sort of Gothic revival of the old deities and the old rites, and Fortuna was not of these. But he must have discovered sooner or later that religion is not an ordinary article of diet to be cooked up and served. A man sticks persistently to his own beliefs in spite of himself ; and Augustus had his personal cult of the fickle goddess with the idea that Fortuna was especially powerful in his own career. She was not apparently one of the "di indigetes" or a member of the Greek pantheon, but she was the one deity whom Augustus found really necessary.

¹ Ovid, *Trist.* V, Eleg. VIII, 15-18.

What caused this strange goddess to become so prominent in Roman thought during the Golden Age? The problem is really, what caused the element of chance to become so important for the average Roman of the period? For whatever Fortuna signified previously, whether — as some have supposed — she was a sun goddess, a moon goddess, a deity of horticulture or plenty, all or none of these, yet at this time, as I have said, she had come to be the most satisfactory figure to embody the idea of chance. If we can explain the popularity of this notion, we shall discover the true secret of the birth of the goddess as we know her. And the explanation is simple. The Empire was a time when Rome was in a state of greatest confusion, when with the power of a vigorous youth it was sending its conquests over the world and making its great discoveries, when the acquaintance with foreign gods increased an interest in the externals of religion, and when the populace, excited by the possibilities of novelty, was tempted to taste the flavor of the new. It was typically a renaissance of wonder. The greatest emphasis was on the unknown and the unattained, and the savor of life was found to be chiefly in risk. In other words, man felt himself so strong that he went out into the dark, where his imagination conjured up ghosts and he was impressed by his own subjection to strange and unsympathetic forces. That is why he put such faith in chaos, the deity of chance, and that is why the familiar goddess Fortuna lost whatever steadiness of purpose she formerly might have had, whatever fixed purpose her old functions had given her, and, being employed to embody the new ideas, she took her position on the top of the turning sphere. In reality she was delighted with fickleness, because during this time the Roman at heart was delighted with change.

Once having accepted the idea of this goddess, the Roman necessarily tried to oppose his own powers to her arbitrariness. His reaction on the faith is, next to his belief in her, the most interesting phase of the problem. How did the Roman citizen of the Empire offset this whimsical fate? He had two resources: one was to bear his adversities with stoic calm and to hope for a better turn of affairs; the other was to limit the rule of the goddess by a belief in another divinity. The first of these is familiar in the words of Virgil:

Quidquid erit; superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.¹

¹ *Æn.* V, 710.

The second of these may be seen in the method of opposing the intellect to Fortuna, of setting one's reason against her unreason, as we read in Juvenal:

Monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare, semita certe
tranquillae per virtutem patet unica vitae.
Nullum nomen habes si sit prudentia, nos te,
nos facimus, Fortuna, deam caeloque locamus.¹

The Roman evidently thought that there were other qualities in the universe, — an implication, even, of another divinity, — on which he could rely or with which his strength could be of some avail, when he dared to oppose Fortuna. This is the manner of the philosophers, who again and again rebuke the popular faith. And this method includes the idea that Fortuna, who dispenses only worldly possessions, has no control over virtue. As Seneca says:

Nihil eripit fortuna, nisi quod dedit: virtutem autem non dat.²

In these ways the Roman tried to offset the power which the goddess had acquired; and the methods, carried a step further, tend to the utter denial of her existence. The deity herself, however, stands out only the more clearly for us as an important reality in the thought of the time.

That she was a reality is most significant for us, because she reveals even more than her own character. She gives us the point of view of the average mind in Imperial Rome. To discover the stamp of this intellect, we have only to remember that the celestial image, which we have been studying on the screen, was cast by mortal rays from the film in the human magic lantern. The film itself will have the same traceries and the same tints. It is a mind that puts its faith in chance; a non-rational, imaginative mind, delighted and impressed by motion and change. The head that contains it, is the head of a vigorous, lively human being, with great courage to do and with fortitude to endure; and yet of a being interested after all in chiefly material and worldly gain. The man is typical of a great class of externally successful and magnetic people, a class not uncommon to-day. But the more intellectual element in the population scorns his creed and pardons him merely because he is so "human." It ought to be easy for us to understand why

¹ *Satira* X, 363. See also the sneers at Fortuna in Pliny, *N. H.*, 2, 22; and Plutarch, *de Fort.* (1) *Fragment* 2, Chaeremon.

² *De Constantia Sap.* V, 2.

Fortuna found so large a following in the troublous times of the Empire ; and to see why she alone of all the Roman deities might be able to survive the transition from a polytheistic to a monotheistic period. It means simply that human nature does not change, that the class which dominated the Golden Age is alive at all times, and that Rome had no monopoly on romanticism.

II

The period in which Christianity triumphed and gained its hold on Europe was none the less difficult for the pagan goddess. At least that period was the great test of her reality for mankind in general. But she was retained in the popular fancy, and numerous literary passages describing her or referring to her have come down to us, testifying that she had some vitality in literature if not elsewhere. The most significant of these allusions for our purposes are those in which the Christian Church feels it necessary to discuss Fortuna as the center of a possible heresy. Thus we see at the outset that Fortuna had still enough life to raise an actual problem in the new sect.

With this problem the early Church had three ways of dealing : it dispensed with the goddess entirely ; it retained her as partly in subjection to the Christian God ; and it retained her as entirely in subjection to the Christian God, as a minister of His grace.

The first of these methods was the only one that offered itself to such theologians as Lactantius, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, and Thomas Aquinas. In Aristotle's discussion of fate and free-will, Fortuna had seemed necessary as the desired figure for the haphazard element in life, a figure which might preserve human free-will. Man, it seemed, could not have choice in his action if everything was preordained by a god. But if chance played a part — a *causa per accidens* as the scholastic philosopher put the idea — mankind had still the freedom of election among the varying possibilities. But St. Thomas, commenting on Aristotle, refused this alluring suggestion :

Sed quamvis haec opinio habeat veram radicem, non tamen bene usi sunt nomine fortunae. Illud enim divinum ordinans non potest dici vel nominari fortuna ; quia secundum quod aliquid participat rationem vel ordinem, recedit a ratione fortunae.¹

¹ Vol. II, ed. Leonis XIII, *Physicorum Aristot.*, p. 77, § 9.

Fortuna, he points out, although she may be conceived as an "inferior cause," is thus subservient to a superior and rational cause, and so the inferior cause is not really "accidental." St. Thomas considers the figure of the goddess altogether confusing and misleading in the scheme of a rational heaven.

Boethius, who lived seven centuries and more before the great ecclesiast, had, however, suggested another solution for the problem, and this is what I have called the second method. In the course of his *Consolatio* he found it helpful to lead his reader's thought up to the complexities of truth by drawing three distinct and, indeed, inconsistent pictures of Fortuna and her work. The first of these is in close agreement with the pagan idea of the supreme and independent deity of chance. The second is the portrait of a beneficent, almost angelic Fortuna: not her who grants favor, but her who disappoints and grieves us. And he contrasts favorable and adverse Fortuna strikingly:

Enitem plus hominibus reor adversam quam prodesse fortunam. illa enim semper specie felicitatis, cum videtur blanda, mentitur: haec semper vera est, cum se instabilem mutatione demonstrat. illa fallit, haec instruit, illa mendacium specie bonorum mentes fruentium ligat, haec cognitione fragilis felicitatis absoluit. itaque illam videas ventosam fluentem suique semper ignaram, hanc sobriam succinctamque et ipsius adversitatis exercitatione prudentem. postremo felix a vero bono devios blanditiis trahit, adversa plerumque ad vera bona reduces unco retrahit.¹

This figure of Fortuna Adversa is rather different from the wholly malignant creation of the first figure in Boethius! She must know the restraint of some higher god, from whom she draws her conception of the *vera bona*. This is where Boethius leaves us so far as the personification, Fortuna, is concerned. But later her work, or the abstract "fortuna," the deeds and not the goddess, are, we discover, entirely under the control of the rational God. Fate is symbolized as the rim of a turning wheel, of which God is the center; and this changeable fate in Boethius seems to be a real equivalent of the abstract "fortuna." This we may take as the third picture of Fortuna in the *Consolatio*.

Beyond this idea that Fortune's work proceeds according to God's will, Boethius does not go. We lose sight of the goddess herself entirely. And even if we feel ourselves justified in saying that implicitly Fortuna

¹ *Cons. Philos.*, ed. Peiper, II, pr. VIII, ll. 7 ff.

is here subject to God, we are forced to make the inference for ourselves. Even Albertus Magnus alters nothing in the condition of the problem, when he takes it over directly from Boethius and accepts the chief figures as he finds them in the *Consolatio*. So far, then, there were only two conceptions of the goddess according to the view of the Church: the pagan goddess, to whom many writers still adhered; and the goddess in partial subjection to the Christian God. There were only two hints of the third, or the more purely Christian conception, which united the other two figures satisfactorily from both points of view.

The contribution of Dante to the world's progress has been called the "Mediæval Synthesis," because he has joined the pagan and the Christian in his use of the sentiments of courtly love. We may now observe that in his study of Fortuna, Dante again reconciles pagan and Christian thought. The familiar passage in the *Inferno*,¹ in which Virgil describes the position of the goddess in the universal plan, retains the old idea of the irrationality of Fortuna, personifies her clearly, and makes her entirely subservient to the will of the Christian God. Like the other angels, she is "ministra e duce"; and her work is general, controlling all "li ben vani" — riches, power, glory, and the like. She has a great scheme, which she continually follows, but which is concealed from mortal eyes.

Questa provvede, giudica e persegue
Suo regno, come il loro gli altri dei.

The sublimity of the figure is increased by a sense of her martyrdom:

Quest' è colei ch' è tanto posta in croce
Pur da color che le dovrian dar lode,
Dandole biasmo a torto, e mala voce.

By the time of Dante the accusations against her gathered together would have formed an ocean of literature:

Ma ella s' è beata e ciò non ode.

If we examine some of the other passages in Dante concerning Fortuna, we can extend her powers. She is the guide of our straying footsteps;² the bestower of fame;³ the goddess of combat;⁴ and she is evidently

¹ VII, ll. 67 ff. ² *Inf.* XV, 46; XXX, 146; XXXII, 76; XIII, 98.

³ *Inf.* XV, 70; *Par.* XVI, 84.

⁴ *Inf.* XXX, 13; *De Mon.*, ed. Moore, *Tutt. le Op.*, II, cap. xi, 45.

related to Death.¹ Once, in a philosophic humor, Dante does glance back briefly to the orthodox and less poetic method of the annihilation of the goddess;² but this surely would not represent the complete statement of his views. With such varied functions as those which he ascribes to Fortuna elsewhere, she must have some significance for him.

His views may be uncovered, if we strip the poetic passage of what may be to us and — let us say for argument — was to him, allegory. Dante believed that in the universal scheme there was a great element of chance, which was entirely subordinate to a higher rational order, and which, because of the miracle of its paradox — like the paradox of fate and free-will, of Divine omnipotence and human power, of Christ's humanity and divinity — could only be represented by symbolism. The inferior but actual order in this whimsical power, for there was order, was hidden from mankind because of the actual inability of man to comprehend it. The best way to imagine this curious force emanating from the Godhead was the way in which one imagined the other forces — as a minister of grace; as an angel.

For this view of the situation Dante had, as I have wanted to make clear, many suggestions in the work of his predecessors, especially Boethius and Albertus Magnus. But we must recognize, I think, that the Christian conception is present in these scholastics only by inference, and that it was left for the poet to add the final touch to the picture.

III

So far in this study, I have considered the main outline of the philosophic discussions of Fortuna and their relation to the treatment in Dante. I have been unable to give any idea of the literary aspect; to present any notion of the numerous discussions of Fortuna in mediæval authors, no matter from what point of view, pagan or Christian. The amazing number, range, and variety of these allusions is a point of the greatest significance in any historical study of the goddess. She is well known to such a heterogeneous group of writers as Martianus Capella, Gerbert of Aurillac, Orderic Vitalis, Walter Map, Hildebert of Lavardin, Alanus de Insulis, Abelard and Heloïse, the writers of the *Carmina Burana*, Nigellus Wireker, and many others, with the numerous early writers in the Italian and French vernacular.

¹ *Canzone* X, 90, ed. Moore.

² *De Mon.* II, cap. x, 70.

In the works of these and later authors, it is astonishing how much space is devoted to the description of the goddess, giving us her personal appearance, her character and her manners, and her particular deeds. The sort of work which seemed to be hers in ancient Rome, the special duties and tasks at which she was found to be busy, continue almost faithfully, as if Fortuna had officially recognized functions in which she must invariably operate. The literary passages, recounting her methods and exploits, fall into an almost regulated set of formulae, in a technical vocabulary, which is handed down from author to author. The detail furnished in all these treatments is enormously richer than that in the Classic Latin writers. The symbolic attributes, the wheel and the dwelling-place, become vital in their relation to Fortune's powers. In brief, she becomes very real, very much alive, and very important to all these mediæval authors.

In fact, it seems as if, because she had no publicly established worship, the poets, story-tellers, and historians wished to emphasize her part the more and to give it due appreciation in the world. What else can it mean when she appears literally hundreds of times in the pages of Boccaccio and Petrarch, and when she is treated as a perfectly natural figure, as a figure absolutely necessary to any account of human affairs. Besides the various casual references, Boccaccio gives many pages to several distinct and individual portraits of the goddess. He makes use of the mass of traditional material as if it were new and startling. Take only a fragment of one of his discussions, that in the *Amorosa Visione*:

Fortuna, "Colei che muta ogni mondano stato," is depicted, sometimes glad and sometimes sad. She turns her great wheel unceasingly to the left. Deaf as she is, she hears no prayer, observes no law or compact. "Let everyone who desires, be bold to mount my wheel," says she; "but when he falls, let him not become angry. I never deny any man the first step." I saw men climb with their wits; and at the top, they said, "I reign." Others fell to the bottom and seemed to say, "I am without reign."¹

And so the discussion goes on, with a long dialogue concerning Fortune's tricks and a warning against them. Every idea that preceding writers had entertained about the goddess is brought to the front, here or elsewhere in Boccaccio, and endowed with fresh interest. And the same

¹ XXXI, 125 ff.

method is familiar in the *Roman de la Rose*, especially in the part written by Jean de Meun, in the work of John Gower and Lydgate, and in many others.

From such a conglomeration of stereotyped detail the passage in Dante is remarkably free. It seems as if the poet knew too much of it already, and felt that on that score all had been said that was necessary, but the very abundance of it gave rise to a problem which, he thought, must be dealt with. In this he is resembled by the great English poet, Chaucer, who after his first acquaintance with the goddess gave very little time to any discussion of her appearance. To these poets, then, Fortuna was a figure quite familiar and very much alive, but she was rather to be sketched briefly with the usual economy of genius. Her cult was completely established, and only the question of her dignity had to be reckoned with.

IV

The conception of Fortuna as an angel of grace, or the "Christian conception," is, so far as we have studied it, entirely the product of the *Divine Comedy*. Unlike the treatments in many other works, it is short, almost scanty in detail, but it is clear and sufficient. It would commend itself to the use of any later poet who wanted to borrow the central idea — as so many poets borrowed the literary machinery of their predecessors. And as a solution of the Christian problem, it was inspired and adaptable. But, strangely enough, the chief writers who followed Dante did not use it.

In Italian literature, this conception appears only in a few poems, mostly anonymous and mostly trivial. They all show direct imitation of Dante, and little original reaction on their own parts. The great Italian writers solve the problem again for themselves. Boccaccio on the one hand rejects the goddess as a "poetic fiction"; on the other, he finds her so useful to cover some idea or other that he uses the figure at every opportunity. We may suspect that he wishes outwardly to remain orthodox, but that really he is a good deal of a pagan. Petrarch several times denies any faith in the goddess so emphatically that perhaps he really deserves to be classed with those writers possessing the simpler and more unadulterated intellects, the writers who annihilated Fortuna. The pagan goddess, however, continues gayly on her way in the work of many

Italians, such as the novelists Sercambi, Da Prato, Sacchetti, Masuccio, Sannazaro, and Giovanni Fiorentino; and the poets Burchiello, Æneas Sylvius, Boiardo, Politian, Benivieni, Pulci, Ariosto, and Bembo. And she is welcomed at the doors of the Renaissance by Machiavelli and Guicciardini. The attitude of compromise, adopted first by Boethius and then maintained by Albertus Magnus, sometimes appears, notably in the work of writers like Fazio degli Uberti, Alberti, and Trissino.

The Christian conception was apparently to be Dante's alone. This state of things again suggests that religion is a purely individual matter; that it springs from personal temperament and not from the published ethics of the world at large. Yet if this is the case, why did not the Christian figure appear elsewhere, independently of Dante, among men of a similar frame of mind if not of an equal greatness?

It is interesting to discover that this is precisely what did happen and that the parallel treatment does not seem in any way indebted to Dante for its origin. We find it in France in the work of three men who lived in Dante's own period and who were therefore less likely to know of the *Divine Comedy*. Their accounts of the angelic power seem to be quite different from that in Dante, so different as to be in no way related. These men are Philippe de Beaumanoir (*flor. circ.* 1250-1296), Watriquet de Couvin (*flor.* 1319-1329), and the author of the dialogue between Fortune and Pierre de la Broche¹ (who was hanged in 1276). My full argument for believing that these authors derive no help from the Italian poet, I cannot present here. To do that, I should have to sketch the growth of the French conception and its approach to the Christian idea, which becomes gradually closer in the work of Simun de Freine, in *L'Escoufle*, in Chrétien de Troyes, and in the *Roman de Renart*.

In England too, the Christian conception appears in the poetry of Chaucer. After he had read Boethius and apparently after he had made his translation, he wrote the *Ballade of Fortune* and later the *Troilus*, where he has an entirely original treatment of the Christian figure. Fortuna is a shepherdess of us "lewed bestes," and in her work she is really but the executrix of Divine "wierdes." Once, to be sure, Chaucer shows that he knew the passage in Dante, but his earliest use has no trace of the Italian figure.

¹ Monmerqué et Michel, *Theatr. Fr.*, pp. 208 ff.

It is, however, reminiscent of Boethius. All these men who make use of the Christian conception seem to have known Boethius and to have felt his influence. But as I have shown, the portrait in the *Consolatio* is not complete. Boccaccio, Petrarch, and countless others, among whom are many direct imitators of the early philosopher, had Boethius at hand, and if they had been qualified they might have finished the picture as they found it there, might have drawn the necessary inference. But only the few writers, Dante in Italy, the three French poets, Chaucer in England, and one or two others, were temperamentally suited to depict the more poetic conception. They alone unite the pagan idea of the haphazard element in life with the Christian idea of the rational scheme of the universe, in a way which fuses the two ideas, without compromise or sacrifice, into one living figure.

V

So far we have observed that three possible conceptions of Fortuna were familiar in the Middle Ages to those who accepted the goddess at all: the pagan, the Christian compromise, and the purely Christian conception. It has seemed likely that the type of figure employed by any particular author depends upon the author's own temperament and not upon the literary fashion of his time. In Rome, the average man had no cause to reject the fickle goddess on account of religious scruples. Yet he might be philosophically moved to believe that the universe was in hands too steady and too sure for the guidance of any such will-o'-the-wisp as the gleaming Fortuna. He would therefore discard Fortuna on rational grounds. The poet might keep her, but the philosopher would disallow her existence. In the Middle Ages, a complication was introduced with the spreading of the new religion; but even the dogmatism of that faith could not save a man from unorthodoxy. The belief in Fortuna could remain, subconsciously hidden but as genuine as ever. Religion in its persistent manner would flourish in the soil of natural disposition, and mankind would be ultimately damned or saved by his own habitual frame of mind.

To-day we may not know what damning or saving means, now that we have at last relegated the personal devil to the virtuoso's collection. But we do know in a way, or at least we can define what we have in mind as the man who deserves to be saved, or the "immortal." However

else we think of him, he is at least the man of the most perfect vision. All critical dialect points in that direction. The pedant (or the over-conscientious) and the popular reviewer (or the under-conscientious) both join in the search for the genius who sees life most clearly.

The belief in Fortuna is rather intimately connected with one's view of the universe. This seems axiomatic, and this is all that the present paper has taken for its hypothesis. The man who annihilates the goddess thinks that the element of chance in the world is negligible; that the divine plan exists to-day as vitally as it ever did; and that the sympathetic god who once put it in operation is strict in applying his scheme. The man who accepts Fortuna rejects all this speculation. Both are destructive philosophers, but the second perhaps more than the first.

If we turn to the familiar critical vocabulary, we find the rationalist labelled classical or pseudo-classical, because of his strong sense of logic and order; and the non-rationalist, or the more emotional and imaginative sort, becomes a "romanticist." There is, of course, a third type: the man who prides himself on his sense of fact and who thinks he is closer to the actualities of life. He is called a "realist" or a "materialist" according to the point of view. This third temperament believes in mere chance, and is incapable of vitalizing the idea even as a "force." So the romanticist accepts the pagan view, as the Renaissance welcomed Fortuna, and delights in the turning wheel, the philosophy of flux and change, in "immer`strebend," and in the glorious march of man into the "ewigkeit." The classicist—in the critical sense—has a goal in sight, and does not feel so sure about the efficiency of cosmic machinery which is turned full speed on a road of infinite uncertainty. Divine dizziness has no attraction for his moral sense. He is not much interested in a race progress which leads nowhere, guided only by the gleam of a transcendental illusion. He denies what he sees about him every day, the great rôle played by accident; or he searches for what he is warned he cannot find while he is human, the divine motivation of human experience.

But there is one type of man not included in these categories, and that is the idealist. The rational thinker and the romanticist too are often touched with idealism, and receive their meed of scorn for it, but they play the game halfway. The true idealist, who will have none of compromise and yet who comprehends everything, is the man who has

a sense of fact honest enough to accept the element of chance in human life, who has an imagination vivid enough to feel the consciousness in the universal forces, and who has rationalism enough to believe at the same time that a great scheme binds and strengthens the apparent discord in unity. To maintain all this, the idealist must bewilder his less visionary brother by saying that all are parts of one great whole, and yet that everything is disconnected and in its way complete. He would not confuse the violin with the player who gives it a voice, or with the wood-carver who gave it his soul. The music might be ultimately the music of the spheres, and yet he would not say that the violin or the player were spherical.

The perfect idealist is, then, as true to reality as the realist, as lofty as the romanticist, and as reasonable as the Classicist. He is all of them at once. He is the true seer, or hero, or poet. His quality accounts for our difficulty in pigeonholing our greatest geniuses like Homer, Dante, and Shakspeare. These men partake of his nature, although individually the balance may not be quite perfect. They may incline more to one of the three types than to another.

One may now reasonably ask: Is the treatment of Fortuna in these authors the real touchstone of their genius? Any reader would immediately see the absurdity of such an idea. Homer does not reveal the Christian conception, nor does Shakspeare for that matter. And again, who are Philippe de Beaumanoir, Watrquet de Couvin, and the other minor writers where the figure appears? It is true that the Christian conception is no measure of *size*, but I have not claimed that it was. It is only a test of *balance*. Homer and Shakspeare do not happen to be engaged in subjective expression. The only other instance where we find their general sanity, their health, their acceptance of order and accident, and their view of the skies as well as of the earth, combined with the expression of frank personal opinion, is in the work of Dante, and there we have the Christian figure. Homer is a shadowy person for us at best; but whoever wrote the *Odyssey* certainly did not disbelieve in chance. Shakspeare, on the other hand, may be inclined to romanticism, but his views are certainly *not* expressed in such passages as critics often select — "To-morrow and to-morrow and to-morrow," — where he has given himself up to his characters. Of the three, Dante alone has any real motive for giving his own views on the problem, and he does give

us the vision of the goddess rejoicing among "l' alte prime creature." In this he is joined by the other lesser writers whom we have mentioned.

The meaning of all this is that these poets of the Christian conception have seen less darkly than the writers of what many might call "the more practical" or "the more intellectual" or "the more untrammelled" sort. Apparently, like the less noteworthy authors of France, one may lack genius and yet having eyes may use them to see. The Middle Ages, having all the varied points of view among their authors, were not so dark as many suppose. Superstition is as much alive to-day as ever, for it arises from under-belief or the denial of everything except chance, as well as from over-belief or trying to measure the Divine purpose too constantly in the world's work. Much that the scientific soothsayer of to-day calls superstition may be simply that extra knowledge which those obtain who have more sources of information than just the one, reason or imagination or physical sense.

In other words, the French poets of the Christian figure were probably the safer guides for their contemporaries, in that they too penetrated the earth and came forth again to look upon the stars; Chaucer, whether or not he saw life steadily, saw it whole; and the critical term "breadth," if it is used in the light of our discussion to describe the qualities of Dante, gains in dignity.

